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ABSTRACT
In the US, most economists argue that professional sports teams are profit-maxi-
mising businesses, but it is a widely held view in Europe that professional foot-
ball clubs are not run on a profit-maximising basis. This belief has important
implications for the impact of widely-advocated policy measures, such as revenue
sharing. This paper looks at the performance of 16 English football clubs that
acquired a stock exchange listing in the mid-1990s. If the European story is true,
we should have observed a shift toward profit-maximising behaviour at these
clubs, under the assumption that investors were attracted to these football clubs
to earn a positive return. This paper finds no evidence of any shift in the behav-
iour of these 16 clubs after flotation. This result is consistent with the view that
football clubs in England have been much more oriented toward profit objectives
than is normally assumed.
Those clubs which have ﬂoated to become public companies –
Manchester United, Newcastle United, Aston Villa, Chelsea,
Tottenham – now have as their principal objective the making
of money for their shareholders.
David Conn, The Football Business, p. 154
I INTRODUCTION
In North America it is commonplace, especially among economists, to think
of the owners of professional sports teams as proﬁt maximisers (Fort and
Quirk, 1995). In Europe, however, this assumption has been treated somewhat
sceptically. In an inﬂuential paper, Sloane (1971) argued that a plausible char-
acterisation of the owners of football clubs is as ‘utility maximisers’ subject to
a budget constraint, where utility is largely associated with success on the
pitch. Reasons for this view include the perceived lack of proﬁtability of foot-
ball clubs and the opinions expressed by club oﬃcials. In some countries,
football clubs are organised as sporting associations which have no sharehold-
ers, but in England all professional clubs are limited companies, and most
have been so for around 100 years. Empirical and theoretical research exists that
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attempts to test the competing hypotheses of proﬁt and utility maximisation in
sports, but this literature neither oﬀers a ﬁrm conclusion nor clearly estab-
lishes evidence supporting one hypothesis over the other.
In order to add to the existing literature on objective functions in sport, this
study focuses on sixteen English football clubs that came to be traded on the
London Stock Exchange in the mid-1990s. For the most part, public trading of
these clubs arose through share placings and oﬀers for sale of up to 100% of the
share capital. The main hypothesis is the following: If the directors of these
clubs were acting as utility maximisers prior to their ﬂotation, then ﬂotation
should have brought about a signiﬁcant change in the club’s objectives, assum-
ing that investors in publicly quoted corporations are interested primarily in
ﬁnancial returns. To test the main hypothesis, this paper examines several
diﬀerent aspects of performance for these sixteen clubs before and after their
ﬂotation. The results indicate that changes in the measured performance of
these clubs do not seem to be consistent with a shift toward more proﬁt-oriented
objectives. That is, ﬂotation appears to have had little or no observable eﬀect
on the maximising behaviour of these 16 clubs that raises capital in the stock
market. This paper explores possible interpretations of the empirical results.
II THE IMPACT OF FLOTATION
The significance of objectives for league policy
The identiﬁcation of a ﬁrm’s objective function is central to understanding its
behaviour, and this is more than usually crucial when it comes to understand-
ing sports clubs and leagues. Members of sports leagues typically enter into a
wide range of restrictive agreements such as revenue sharing, limitations on
players spending (salary caps and roster limits), and restrictions on player
mobility. These restraints, or so the team owners claim, are necessary to pre-
serve competitive balance without which the league’s product will become
unattractive. Antitrust authorities have in general been persuaded by this line
of argument. However, critics such as Fort and Quirk (1995) and Vrooman
(2000) have argued that these restraints will be tend to raise proﬁts, that this
is the true motive for their adoption by owners, and that the impact on com-
petitive balance will be negligible or non-existent. The assumption of proﬁt
maximisation is critical to the validity of these claims with respect to competi-
tive balance, as has been shown in work of Kesenne (1996, 2000).
Consider, for example, the case of collectively sold broadcast rights. In the
North American sports leagues, the income derived from collective sale is typi-
cally divided equally among the teams. What eﬀect will collectively-sold rights
have on behaviour as compared to the alternative where teams negotiate their
own broadcast rights individually and retain the income for themselves? Let us
suppose that if rights are sold individually then there are some large-market
teams that will generate substantially more income than small-market teams. If
owners are proﬁt maximisers, there is reason to doubt whether collective selling
will improve the competitive balance of the league, since owners are under no
obligation to spend what they receive. Thus, a small market team may receive
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more income under collective selling, but may not choose to spend more on
creating a successful team. Under the proﬁt maximisation hypothesis, owners
should spend up to the point where the marginal revenue of a win equals the
marginal cost, and a ﬁxed share of broadcast income will aﬀect neither mar-
ginal revenue nor marginal cost.1 However, if the owners are utility maximisers
whose principal interest is success on the pitch, then collective selling will
improve competitive balance. By assumption teams spend what they get on the
pursuit of sporting success, and collective selling means more spending power
for the small-market teams and less spending for the large-market teams.
Ownership and motives in English football
In this paper, we are interested in the possible change in behaviour associated
with stock market ﬂotation for UK football clubs. The ownership structure of
football clubs in the UK is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the model adopted in
other countries. In most of Europe, football clubs have typically been organ-
ised as not-for-proﬁt sporting associations. Even very large clubs, such as Bar-
celona and Bayern Munich, have been run as clubs in a legal sense, i.e.
controlled by members who pay an annual subscription and commercially
managed by a club committee. One of the most practical consequences of this
arrangement is that non-UK football clubs have not been able to take advan-
tage of limited liability and, therefore, their ability to borrow has been con-
strained. Football clubs in England and Scotland sought to evade this
restriction as early as the 19th century. No fewer than 68 of the 92 teams in
the four English professional divisions adopted limited company status prior
to the First World War, the majority before 1900.2
The conventional view is that the ownership of a limited company resides
with the shareholders and that the shareholders are motivated by proﬁt. How-
ever, there are plausible reasons to doubt this in the case of English football
clubs. Firstly, an analysis of shareholder lists suggests that the original sub-
scribers were largely drawn from a club’s locality and were frequently sup-
porters of the club; hence, the proﬁt motive may have been tempered by an
interest in sporting success. Even shareholders with purely commercial inter-
ests (such as local brewers) may have been interested in the success of the club
from the perspective of generating income for their core businesses rather than
for any direct ﬁnancial return.3
Secondly, over time most of these clubs came to be concentrated in the
hands of a small number of wealthy individuals, usually because the limited
1 Indeed, collective selling will impair competitive balance if it leads to a disproportionate
fall in the marginal revenue from winning for the small-market team (Szymanski and Kes-
enne, 2004).
2 For more details on the early history of English football clubs see Mason (1980), Vamp-
lew (1988), Tischler (1981), and Inglis (1988).
3 Morrow (1999) provides a detailed analysis of the motivation of directors with dominant
shareholdings. An approach that would be complementary to ours would be to analyse the
changes in ownership that occurred before and after ﬂotation. However, this is a huge task
in itself and beyond the scope of this paper.
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company had fallen into ﬁnancial diﬃculties. Often these individuals were
supporters themselves, and therefore unlikely to view their ownership of the
club as a purely ﬁnancial proposition.4
This does not exclude the possibility that some owners of football clubs
were motivated primarily by proﬁt. But arguably what distinguishes a private,
limited company from a public, limited company (i.e., one that is ﬂoated on
the stock exchange) is that in the latter case the proﬁt motive is likely to be
stronger than in the former. It is not that the listing requirements of the stock
exchange oblige companies to maximise proﬁts, but rather that a stock
exchange listing typically introduces a class of investors with little or no inter-
est in the business other than the returns that it can generate, either through
the payment of dividends or the appreciation of the share price. For instance,
insurance companies and pension funds own the largest share of stock in most
listed companies. The listing requirements of a stock exchange are intended to
provide investors with all the information they require to make an informed
decision about investment prospects. The directors of the company are thus
obliged to achieve a return for their stockholders or see the company shares
decline and risk a hostile takeover that may see them lose their jobs. Thus,
while we cannot state with certainty that the directors of any single company
will be more proﬁt-oriented following a stock market ﬂotation, we can reason-
ably argue that on average directors of companies with a listing will be more
proﬁt-oriented than directors of companies that do not have a listing.5
The predicted impact of a change of objectives
We now develop a model designed to illustrate the expected impacts of a
change of owner’s objectives from that of utility maximisation to proﬁt maxi-
misation. We suppose that the objective of a football club’s owners is to maxi-
mise a weighted average of proﬁt and the success of the team. That is, we
begin with the assumption of utility maximisation. To simplify the analysis,
consider a league consisting of two teams, where teams invest in talent t to
produce wins w.6
4 A third reason is that the FA disapproved of the proﬁt motive in football and took
action to try and limit commercialism by means such as imposing a limit on the maximum
dividend payable by football clubs. But by the 1980s restraints such as these had lost their
signiﬁcance (there are other ways for clubs to reward shareholders) and the will of the FA to
restrain commercialism had largely evaporated.
5 Interestingly, most major North American sports leagues ban stock market ﬂotation on
the grounds that this will lead to excessive commercialisation. This is perhaps odd given the
prevailing view that team owners in North America are dyed-in-the-wool proﬁt maximisers.
See Cheﬃns (1998) for a critical discussion of this issue.
6 Szymanski and Smith (1997), Szymanski and Kuypers (1999), Hall et al. (2002) all pro-
vide evidence that the wage bill is the biggest single factor explaining league performance.
Forrest and Simmons (2002) ﬁnd that wage bills are reliable predictors for team success.
They also tested the reliability of wages as predictors for success in North American sports
as well as continental European football and found signiﬁcant correlations. Deloitte & Tou-
che in their Annual Review of Football Finance consistently use wages expenditure to
explain on the pitch success. An alternative approach using estimated transfer values is advo-
cated by Dawson et al. (2000), but they also ﬁnd that wage expenditure is closely correlated
with playing success.
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Equation (1) is a ‘contest success function’ which translates total league
expenditure on talent into winning percentage for team one.
w1 ¼ t1
t1 þ t2 ð1Þ
Equation (1) is the logit function commonly used in the analysis of contests
and tournaments.7
Further, suppose that revenue is concave, increasing with wins up to some
point and then decreasing, reﬂecting the possibility that fans care about com-
petitive balance. Assuming asymmetry in the income that teams can generate
from wins, the proﬁt functions for each team are:
p1 ¼ ðr w1Þw1  ct1; ð2Þ
and
p2 ¼ ð1 w2Þw2  ct2; ð3Þ
where r is a measure of asymmetry and c is the (constant) marginal cost of
hiring talent. Without loss of generality, assume r > 1 so that team one has
greater revenue-generating potential than team two, which would be the case
if team one was located in a larger market. Since the owners are assumed to
value both proﬁts and success on the pitch, we can state the objective function
as a weighted average of proﬁt and wins. Thus for team one:
X1 ¼ a1p1 þ ð1 a1Þw1 ¼ a1ðr w1Þ þ 1 a1½ w1  a1ct1; ð4Þ
where a1 is a positive number less than or equal to 1. As the weight on wins
increases (1  a1), proﬁts must eventually decrease, since wins cost money
(via increased talent expenditure) and eventually reduce income (as league
becomes excessively unbalanced).8
We deﬁne Ω2 analogously.
Given these objectives the ﬁrst-order conditions for the clubs’ owners are:
@X1
@t1
¼ a1ðr 2w1Þ þ 1 a1½  t2ðt1 þ t2Þ2
 a1c ¼ 0; ð5Þ
and
@X2
@t2
¼ a2ð1 2w2Þ þ 1 a2½  t1ðt1 þ t2Þ2
 a2c ¼ 0; ð6Þ
from which we can derive the Nash equilibrium win percentage for team one
in Equation (7).
w1 ¼ a1a2ðr 1Þ þ a2a1a2ðr 1Þ þ a1 þ a2 ð7Þ
7 See Nti (1997) for an analysis of diﬀerent functional forms.
8 Sloane (1971) assumed that a zero proﬁt constraint applied to the clubs, but this is not
clear given that a ‘sugar daddy’ might choose to fund a club’s losses in order to achieve suc-
cess. Examples of this type of conduct abound, not only in football but in all major sports.
Szymanski and Kuypers (1999) discuss some examples from football).
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From Equation (7), it straightforward to show that the win percentage of
team one will decrease when the weight on proﬁts (a1) increases, i.e.
@w1
@a1
¼ a2
a1a2ðr 1Þ þ a1 þ a2ð Þ2
: ð8Þ
9
An owner who becomes more interested in proﬁt will invest less in playing
talent in response to the reduced optimum winning percentage. Less investment
in talent will increase proﬁts (otherwise the owners could have both increased
proﬁt and success by investing more in talent prior to change in objectives).
This, then, is the predicted eﬀect of stock market ﬂotation on the team that
ﬂoats; speciﬁcally, clubs that ﬂoat on the stock market are expected to see a
decrease in winning percentage and a concomitant decrease in talent investment.
We can also consider the eﬀect of a change in one team’s objective on the
performance of the other team. Consider ﬁrst the ratio of winning percent-
ages, which in this model equals the ratio of playing talent. At equilibrium
the expression for this is:
w1
w2
¼ t1
t2
¼ a1a2ðr 1Þ þ a2
a1
: ð9Þ
From this it is apparent that a fall in investment in talent for team two will
lead to a fall in investment in talent at team two. Since the team 2 spends less
on talent and has an increased win percentage, its proﬁts must increase, and
therefore the change in objectives of team 1 should raise the proﬁtability of its
rival clubs.
These eﬀects follow directly from the supposed change in objectives. Indi-
rect consequences may follow as well if the increased scrutiny imposed by the
listing requirements cause directors to be more circumspect in their policies.
First, this may involve the avoidance of excessive risks, thus creating a more
stable earnings stream. Secondly, it may imply a shift in distribution policy
toward higher and more regular dividend payments, which are sometimes con-
sidered an important indicator of company performance by market investors.
Thirdly, it may be that company eﬃciency is improved, so that resources are
more productive and opportunities are exploited more fully. In the case of
football clubs, ﬂotation may be associated with a higher degree of commer-
cialism, such as raising ticket prices if it is proﬁtable to do so and increasing
club-branding eﬀorts.
III DATA
During the 1980s, business-minded entrepreneurs began appearing on the
managing boards of football clubs (King, 1998). In 1983, one such business-
man was Irving Scholar, who masterminded the ﬁrst ﬂoatation of an English
football club: the North London club Tottenham Hotspur. The public oﬀering
9 Win percentage for team two is also decreasing in the weight placed by its owners on
proﬁt. Note that when there is no asymmetry in revenue generating potential (r = 1), the
optimum win percentage depends simply on the relative weights placed on proﬁt by the two
teams (a2/(a1 + a2)) and winning percentage is still decreasing in a1.
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of shares in Tottenham Football Club PLC, a holding company formed to
bypass English FA restrictions against paying excessive dividends, was part of
a strategy by Scholar to improve the ﬁnancial situation at the club. In 1989,
South London-based Millwall Football Club became the second English club
to list on the stock exchange. Millwall’s strategy was to create a leisure group
which would provide additional services (bars, restaurants and other leisure
facilities) in order to buttress low turnover due to poor gate receipts. The
third English football club to ﬂoat on the stock exchange was Manchester
United in 1991. Martin Edwards became chief executive and majority share-
holder by inheriting his father Louis’ shares. The younger Edwards was twice
approached to sell his stake in the club. The ﬁrst approach was made by Rob-
ert Maxwell in 1984, with an oﬀer of £10 million. Then in 1989, it seemed
almost certain that Michael Knighton would become the new owner, only for
the deal to fall through due to his questionable funding methods. Eventually
on 31 May 1991, Manchester United oﬀered over 2.5 million shares to the
public via the London Stock Exchange. A major reason for Manchester Uni-
ted’s ﬂoat in 1991 was to fund the restructuring of the Stretford End.
The huge increase in broadcasting income associated with the advent of the
Premier League and the rapid appreciation of Manchester United share cre-
ated conditions in the mid-1990s such that the stock market was receptive to
new issues. Between October 1995 and October 1997, a further sixteen English
clubs obtained a listing. Table 1 gives details of the ﬂotation timeline for these
16 clubs.
Table 1
Flotation Timeline
Club Float date Method % oﬀered/placed
Preston North End October 95 Placing/oﬀer 86
Chelsea March 96 Introduction 0a
Leeds United August 96 Takeover and placing/oﬀer 60
Queens Park Rangers October 96 Placing/oﬀer 44
Sunderland December 96 Placing/oﬀer 26
Sheﬃeld United January 97 Takeover and placing/oﬀer 42
Southampton January 97 Reverse takeover 100
West Bromwich Albion January 97 Placing 100
Birmingham City March 97 Placing 30
Charlton Athletic March 97 Placing/oﬀer 35
Bolton Wanderers April 97 Reverse takeover 100
Newcastle United April 97 Oﬀer 28
Aston Villa May 97 Placing/oﬀer 16
Swansea City August 97 Takeover 0b
Leicester City October 97 Introduction 0c
Nottingham Forest October 97 Oﬀer 11
aChelsea FC is owned by Chelsea Village PLC in which the directors and three other interests jointly held
83.5% of the equity at the company’s introduction.
bSwansea City FC was purchased by Silver Shield PLC, a car windscreen replacement company.
Although located in Wales, Swansea plays in English Football League and hence is treated as an ‘English’
club.
cLeicester City FC was acquired by Soccer Investments PLC.
MAKING MONEY OUT OF FOOTBALL 31
Scottish Journal of Political Economy
© 2015 Scottish Economic Society
The ﬁnancial data come from the FAME database of UK-company
accounting information which provides online records for 2.8 million public
and private UK companies for the previous 10 years. Thus, in most cases we
are able to track a club’s ﬁnancial performance for about 5 years before and
5 years after ﬂotation. FAME accounts data includes proﬁt and loss accounts,
balance sheet items, cash ﬂow and ratios, as well as security and price infor-
mation. These data are supplemented with data on club performance based
on end-of-season rankings.
Our estimation strategy is to search for any changes in the performance of
these ﬂoated companies.10 We examine four main indicators: (i) operating
proﬁts; (ii) league ranking; (iii) relative wage expenditures; and (iv) relative
revenues.11 The ﬁrst two variables shed light directly on any possible change
in objectives associated with ﬂotation. The last two measures should be caus-
ally related to changes in the ﬁrst two variables. For instance, increased wage
expenditures likely lead to better performance in terms of league ranking.
And, increased revenues may be reﬂected in greater proﬁtability.
Profits and dividends
There are signiﬁcant problems associated with the use of accounting proﬁts to
measure the ﬁnancial performance of sports businesses, as is well documented
in the US literature on the subject.12
When proﬁt and loss statements form the basis of tax assessments, ﬁrms
have a signiﬁcant incentive to understate proﬁts. Particular government poli-
cies, for example those related to depreciation, may create tax loopholes
which enable ﬁrms to reduce proﬁts and legally limit their tax liability. Own-
ers may charge expenses to the company which bear little relation to any eco-
nomic services rendered, thereby legally transferring taxable income away
from the company. Alternatively, companies may be able to illegally evade
tax by exaggerating expenses.
Table 2 reports operating proﬁts for the 15 of the 16 clubs listed in Table 1.
Almost all clubs have experienced declining proﬁts since ﬂoatation with no
10 Since Tottenham, Millwall, and Manchester United were listed during this entire period
their performance has not been considered.
11 Operating proﬁt indicates the day-to-day operations of a football club capturing how
well a club performs in its ordinary business. Operating proﬁt takes into account revenues
via gate receipts, marketing and merchandising, broadcasting and other commercial activities
as well as wages, salaries, cost of goods sold and various other operating costs such as amor-
tisation of player costs. It does not include ﬁnancing costs and exceptional items (Deloitte &
Touche, 2003). Wage spending and revenues are expressed in terms of deviations from the
divisional average for two purposes. First, given the rapid escalation of ticket prices, broad-
cast rights values, and player salaries, a relative measure provides a consistent basis for com-
parison across years. Second, in the context of a sports league an absolute indicator of
ﬁnancial performance such as proﬁts is likely to depend on the use of inputs measured in rel-
ative terms rather than absolute terms.
12 For example, see Scully (1989) and Quirk and Fort (1992). Both of these studies draw
heavily on the work of Roger Noll who dissected the proﬁts statements of Major League
Baseball teams on behalf of the players’ union in the 1980s and found that reported account-
ing proﬁts signiﬁcantly understated economic proﬁts.
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club reporting a positive operating proﬁt. Newcastle reported a cumulative
loss of £25m over this period, while Nottingham Forest reported a cumulative
loss of £36m. In general a business that runs perpetually at an economic loss
will be closed by its owners if they are proﬁt maximisers. Several of the clubs
did in fact have to undergo a signiﬁcant restructuring. The shares of Notting-
ham Forest, Queens Park Rangers (Loftus Road PLC), and Leicester City
have all been suspended from the market, while the latter two clubs entered
administration in 2001 and 2002 respectively. Loftus Road is no longer a
listed company, while the shares of Leicester City remain suspended at the
date of writing. Nottingham Forest had their shares delisted in 2002 following
their failure to publish their accounts and in anticipation of a restructuring
involving a cash injection of £5m from a wealthy supporter. Swansea City,
which was taken over by a listed company in 1997 was sold to it Managing
Director for £1 during the 2000/01 season. Thus, it may be that the losses
indicated reﬂect a genuine failure to produce an economic return. On the
other hand, Bolton has reported an operating loss in each of the last nine sea-
sons without ﬁling for bankruptcy, while Newcastle has paid out dividends in
each of the past ﬁve seasons (totalling £14m) despite the size of its reported
losses.
The ability to pay dividends is generally viewed as an indicator of ﬁnancial
health, although there may be many good reasons for not paying dividends. It
makes little sense for a company with proﬁtable investment opportunities to
return internally generated funds to shareholders. Of the quoted football clubs
only six paid dividends: Aston Villa, Bolton, Newcastle, Southampton, Sun-
derland, and West Bromwich Albion. The total payout across those years
were available was in the region of £0.9m per club per season.
In the ﬁve or so years prior to ﬂotation, the listed clubs in total reported
losses of £17m in aggregate, an average of £0.2m per club. In the ﬁve or so
years since ﬂotation, aggregate losses have been £284m, an average of £3.8m
per club, around 15 times larger than before ﬂotation. Surprisingly, only
West Bromwich Albion reported improved proﬁts on average post ﬂoatation.
The operating proﬁts of Leicester, Nottingham, Preston North End, Queens
Park Rangers, and Sheﬃeld Untied have decreased signiﬁcantly based on
standard t-tests. Using pre-tax proﬁt as an additional measure, only Aston
Villa, Chelsea Village, Sunderland and West Bromwich Albion reported posi-
tive proﬁts on average and were also the only clubs where proﬁtability
improved.13
It might be argued that proﬁtability should be compared against industry
levels. There are roughly sixty-ﬁve clubs that did not change status during the
sample for which we have accounting data.14
In the 5 years from 1992 to 1996, these clubs reported an aggregate loss of
£213m, an average loss of about £0.9m per season per club. In the period
13 That is, all other clubs experienced greater losses than before ﬂotation. Chelsea Village
also appears to have had higher proﬁts before ﬂotation, but the series is too short to make a
reasonable comparison.
14 We exclude Manchester United, Millwall, and Tottenham.
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1997 to 2002, these clubs reported an aggregate loss of £665m, equivalent to
around £2.27m per season per club. Thus, it appears that clubs that ﬂoated
had much larger losses after listing, and in relative terms their losses increased
after they were listed. If proﬁt-maximising concerns had weighed signiﬁcantly
more heavily after ﬂotation, it seems hard to believe that the directors of the
listed clubs could not have done a lot more to bring their proﬁtability into
line with average of other clubs.15
The decline in proﬁtability also seems to be reﬂected in the changing mar-
ket valuations of the clubs. The market values of clubs analysed here declined
steadily and signiﬁcantly after ﬂotation, with the exception of Charlton and
Chelsea. Furthermore, this performance contrasted sharply with that of Man-
chester United and the market in general until the stock market started to
decline in 2000. This is consistent with a rational valuation of football club
shares based on expected proﬁtability.
League performance
Team performance can be measured in several ways. Clubs compete in a num-
ber of sporting competitions: the domestic league, the FA Cup, the League
Cup, and at the highest level the UEFA Cup and Champions’ League. We
choose to use domestic league ranking as our measure of relative performance
because it is the competition within which teams play most of their matches
andclub performance over time is comparable on this basis. Table 3 reports
league rank for each of the 16 clubs in each season under analysis.
The most striking feature of the data in Table 3 is that in 12 out of 16
cases, average league performance was better in the 6 years following stock
market ﬂotation than in the 5 years before. Moreover, in three of the four
cases where clubs dropped in performance also fell into severe ﬁnancial diﬃ-
culties and have lost their listing (Nottingham Forest, Queen’s Park Rangers
and Swansea City). It seems quite likely that it is the ﬁnancial crisis at these
clubs, rather than the stock market listing, that led to the deterioration in
performance. Thus, all but one of the clubs that have retained their stock
market listing since the mid-1990s have improved their league performance.
While this suggests a quite powerful tendency towards improved performance,
some caution should be exercised given the small number of observations
involved. Eleven clubs changed position signiﬁcantly pre- and post-ﬂotation.
Birmingham, Bolton, Charlton, Chelsea, Preston North End, Sunderland, and
West Bromwich Albion signiﬁcantly improved league performance, while
Nottingham, QPR, Sheﬃeld United, and Swansea performed signiﬁcantly
worse.16
15 There is quite a lot of variability in ﬁnancial performance. Manchester United, the larg-
est and most proﬁtable club by far is often cited as an outlier, but omitting it from the set of
clubs whose status did not change does not alter the proﬁle of proﬁtability that much. With-
out Manchester United the 92–96 average is a loss of £0.2m compared to a loss of £0.7m in
the 97-01 period.
16 West Bromwich’s improvement is largely associated with the last two seasons (and their
subsequent promotion to the Premier League).
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Wage spending
Clubs can improve their league performance by hiring or otherwise acquiring
better players. Since there is a well-functioning market for player talent, any
improvement in player quality can only be achieved through higher wage
spending.17 Wage spending is here deﬁned in two ratios: relative to the aver-
age wage spending of all teams in the league and also relative to average
wage spending relative to the clubs’ divisions. Relativity is appropriate since
it not absolute spending that produces success, but outspending your rivals.
Table 4 reports wage spending relative to the league as a whole. In 50% of
cases, wage spending relative to the league average increased post ﬂotation.
As with performance, spending relative to the league also fell at those
quoted clubs that fell into ﬁnancial diﬃculties (Nottingham Forest, Queens
Park Rangers, and Swansea, but not Leicester City). Relative league spend-
ing also fell at Birmingham City, Preston North End, Sheﬃeld United,
Southampton, and West Bromwich Albion. However, in these cases the rela-
tive decline was quite small. Some clubs saw very large league relative
increases in spending, notably Bolton, Charlton, Chelsea, Leeds, Leicester,
Newcastle, and Sunderland. In the cases of Bolton, Charlton, Leicester,
Newcastle and Sunderland, these were also clubs that witnessed a signiﬁcant
improvement in performance.
Table 5 shows wage expenditures relative to division averages. When
spending is compared to divisional averages, increases occurred in seven of
the ﬂoated clubs post ﬂoatation.18 Notably, three of the clubs that increased
spending on average were also promoted at some point post ﬂoatation. This
is surprising since comparatively, the wages spent would be relative against
a larger divisional average. If we compare clubs that did not change divi-
sions over the time period (Aston Villa, Chelsea, Leeds United, and South-
ampton) only Chelsea increased its wages relative to other clubs in the same
division.
Revenues
Clubs ﬂoated on the stock market may choose to exploit their commercial
opportunities more eﬀectively, e.g. through merchandising and sponsorship.
This would manifest itself in the ability the extract higher revenues from a
given level of performance. Since on average relative performance improved
post-ﬂotation, one might reasonably expect that revenues relative to the lea-
gue average would improve at most if not all clubs. In fact, revenues
improved at only six clubs out of the 16 relative to the league average and at
only seven relative to the divisional averages (Table 6, Table 7).
17 This is generally true unless the club possesses some distinctive capability that enables
them to extract a better level of performance from a given player than any other club. See
Szymanski and Kuypers (1999), chapter 6 for a discussion of this possibility.
18 Queens Park Rangers is one of these however it should be noted that since 1999, Lim-
ited accounts have not been ﬁled and PLC accounts contain data for London Wasps Rugby
Club.
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IV ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
The analysis thus far has been discussed in terms of simple averages. These
shed light on the proposition that ﬂotation shifted football club owners away
from utility maximisation toward proﬁt maximisation given that such a
change in objectives is likely to lead to an increase in proﬁts and a relative
decline in performance on the ﬁeld. However, another approach is to look at
the underlying causal relationships. The ﬁrst causal mechanism that underlies
the analysis in this paper is that league performance is determined by the
quality of players hired in a competitive market so that in general higher
player expenditure leads to better league performance. The second link is that
better performance will generate increased revenue as teams attract fans, spon-
sorship and other income as a result of increased success. This is essentially
the model proposed and estimated in Szymanski and Smith (1997). Each team
chooses a level of investment in playing talent to meet its target level of per-
formance and proﬁt given their underlying objectives and capabilities. We can
write:
Pit ¼ aibwit; ð10Þ
and
Rit ¼ ci þ dPit: ð11Þ
P is league rank, w is wage expenditure relative to the average and R is reve-
nue relative to the average. The a and c parameters represent intrinsic diﬀer-
ences in terms of productivity (the eﬃciency of turning player spending into
performance) and revenue generating capacity (from a given level of support).
Each team then has an objective function that is a weighted average of proﬁts
and performance:
Xit ¼ kpit þ ð1 kÞPit; ð12Þ
so that if, for example, k = 1, the club cares only about proﬁt. Here we ask
whether ﬂotation might change the underlying causal relationship as well as
the weighting on proﬁt. In eﬀect, we test to see whether a and c are aﬀected
by ﬂotation. This might be because a stock market listing is a more eﬀective
discipline on company managers and hence they become more productive,
either in their ability to generate playing performance from a given investment
(a) or to generate income from success (c). Note that ﬂotation, since it raises
income from the ﬂotation proceeds, should at least increase c in the short run.
Dynamic Modelling and the Error Correction Mechanism
The data available here is an unbalanced panel, which is characterised by a
relatively small time dimension (T ranges from 4 to 10, with average T = 8.8)
but a large number of clubs (N = 86). In economics there are many relation-
ships that are dynamic in nature and a major advantage of panel data is that
we are better equipped to examine the dynamics of a relationship. Hence, the
question we are interested in is essentially a dynamic one of the adjustment,
which takes place in a club over time to ﬂotation. However, due to small T
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and large N, we therefore have a very well known problem in panel data esti-
mation, which was ﬁrst outlined by Nickell (1981) that under these circum-
stances OLS dynamic panel data estimation is subject to considerable bias.
We therefore employ the GMM estimation technique proposed by Arellano
and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) to estimate dynamic panel
data models. Essentially these techniques build up a recursive varying set of
instruments which provide good small sample performance even in the face of
relatively short time periods (T), a good survey of these techniques may be
found in Baltagi (1995).
Given that actual outcomes in football will often deviate substantially from
planned results, the most natural approach to estimating these relationships is
using an error correction model. The parameters from the error correction
speciﬁcation allow us to make inferences about the long-term equilibrium and
short run adjustments towards this equilibrium. The long run structure is indi-
cated by the coeﬃcients on the level terms whereas the short term adjustments
are captures in the diﬀerenced terms of the error correction model. We also
allow for the fact that our explanatory variables are predetermined variables;
hence we use the lagged variables as valid instruments suggested by the
Arellano and Bond study, diﬀerenced at period t  1. Our two estimating
equations are:
DRit ¼ ci þ b1Rit1 þ b2DRit1 þ b3Pit1 þ b4DPit1 þ b5Qit1
þ b6DQit1 þ b7Dit1 þ b8DDit1 þ b9PRit1 þ b10DPRit1
þ b11RELit1 þ b12DRELit1 þ et ð13Þ
DPit ¼ ai þ d1Pit1 þ d2DPit1 þ d3wit1 þ d4Dwit1 þ d5Qit1
þ d6DQit1 þ d7Dit1 þ d8DDit1 þ d9PRit1 þ d10DPRit1
þ d11RELit1 þ d12DRELit1 þ gt
where revenues (R), wage expenditure (w) (both in orthogonal deviations)
and league performance (P) are expressed in logs, Q is a dummy variable
that indicates periods when clubs are listed on the stock market, D indi-
cates the league division in which the team plays, PR is a dummy indicat-
ing winning promotion in the current season and REL is a dummy
indicating being relegated in the current season. The division variable will
account for the level of competition in the league on performance and also
the market size of the club with respect to revenue generation. Promotion
and relegation dummies will also account for the movement between the
divisions with respect to performance and also the generation (or loss) of
income when a team is promoted (or relegated). The Q dummy will take a
value of 1 the season after a club has ﬂoated on the stock market. For
example, Birmingham City ﬂoated in March 1997; hence Q would have a 0
for the 1996/97 season and a 1 for the subsequent seasons. Parameter esti-
mates are reported in Table 8. The ﬁrst three columns report estimates for
the revenue equation, the last three columns reports estimates for the per-
formance equation.
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We are interested primarily in the sign and signiﬁcance of the quoted vari-
ables. In an error correction model the terms speciﬁed in diﬀerences specify
the way in which a given variable inﬂuences the adjustment toward equilib-
rium and the levels terms deﬁne the underlying long term equilibrium relation-
ship. The most important result therefore is that the variable deﬁning stock
market ﬂotation is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in each of the regressions
reported – suggesting that stock market ﬂotation has no long-term impact on
the performance of the club. In other words, quoted teams are not expected
to generate more revenue in the long term from a given league position or to
generate a better league position from a given wage expenditure relative to the
average. However, given that the clubs that ﬂoated are mostly in the Premier-
ship and First Division, we also ran identical error correction models adjust-
ing for divisional averages. These results were almost identical to those
reported in Table 8 with indicating that even comparing the listed clubs with
their closest industry peers, being listed did not impact long term or short
term revenue generation. The ﬁrst of these is perhaps most surprising, since
many would have expected quoted clubs to exploit commercial opportunities
of success more eﬃciently. One interpretation of this result is that all teams
exploit commercial opportunities fully, regardless of ownership. Another qual-
iﬁcation we might add is that the adjustment period is longer than our panel
allows. The estimates of the dynamic terms tell a slightly diﬀerently story. In
the wage-performance and performance-revenue equations, the dynamic terms
are insigniﬁcant, suggesting that there was not even a short-term adjustment
brought about by ﬂotation. We also tested for slope eﬀects concerning the
quotation dummy and found them to be insigniﬁcant indicating that ﬂoata-
tion does not have an interactive eﬀect on performance or revenues.
V DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Interpreting the ﬁndings of this paper requires some caution. On the face of it
there appears to have been a decline in proﬁtability accompanied by increase
in relative spending and league performance among clubs that ﬂoated some
shares on the market in the mid-1990s. One might question whether these
results, given the size of the sample, are statistically signiﬁcant, but the main
fact is that the expectation, based on economic theory, that proﬁts should
increase and league performance decline following ﬂotation, does not seem to
be supported by the data.
First we must address the potential for sample selection bias. Did the clubs
that ﬂoated, already hold a disposition towards proﬁt maximisation? Accord-
ing to King (2003) the massive increase in turnover during the 1990s necessi-
tated the creation of new business structures. Due to increased trans-national
competition, commercialisation it is imperative for clubs to remain competi-
tive in the transfer market. Directors may also have been inclined to list
shares in order to sustain a club’s ﬁnancial position and maintain value and
competitiveness (King, 2003). It can be argued that many of the shareholders
and directors of clubs (listed or not) invested in football clubs as a means to
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increase their public proﬁle and status, one example being Alan Sugar who
owned Tottenham between 1991 and 2001 (King, 1998). In such cases ﬂoata-
tion might bring about even more recognition (or infamy) along with funds to
increase club status. However it could also be argued that non-ﬂoating clubs
are run and invested in by a class of investors that do not want to share deci-
sion-making with other potential investors who may not view playing success
as paramount. But even those clubs that have not ﬂoated, according to King
(2003), have ‘restructured their management practices and structures in line
with public limited companies.’ Individual motivations behind institutional
investors and directors may be better addressed by a sociological study than
by our economic analysis. Regardless of historical ownership, once a club
ﬂoats, it is inconceivable that it will not experience some change in behaviour.
Also, one could argue the potential for selection bias in the size of clubs
that chose to ﬂoat. All the sample clubs except Preston North End and Swan-
sea were First Division or Premiership clubs, so measuring relative proﬁtabil-
ity between these ‘larger’ clubs that did ﬂoat and the ‘smaller’ clubs that
didn’t could be a source of bias. However if we make comparisons with clubs
that did not ﬂoat and which belonged to either Division 1 or the Premiership
(a sample of 26 clubs), then pre-1997 proﬁts for these non-ﬂoating clubs were
actually lower, averaging £1.5m. Post-1997, these clubs had comparable
losses of £3.7m on average per season.
But there is more than one interpretation of these ﬁndings. We can identify
the main contending explanations.
(i) All football clubs were proﬁt maximisers before ﬂotation – so that entry
onto the stock market did not lead to any appreciable change in behav-
iour.
(ii) The clubs that floated were proﬁt maximisers before ﬂotation – so that
entry onto the stock market did not lead to any appreciable change in
behaviour relative to the average .
(iii) Accounting proﬁts give a poor indication of economic proﬁts, so that the
ﬁgures cannot truly indicate any change in economic performance.
(iv) Post ﬂotation accounts of PLC’s include data related to group business
activities that extend beyond the football club and are therefore not com-
parable to the pre-ﬂotation data.
(v) These clubs did not become proﬁt maximisers after ﬂotation because:
a Professional investors were unable to exercise control (only small
amounts of shares were oﬀered to the market); and/or
b Professional investors were not interested – only fans bought shares.
(vi) The directors mistakenly believed that the appropriate way to operate as
a proﬁt maximiser was to invest heavily in playing talent in the anticipa-
tion of future success generating larger proﬁts.
All of the arguments apart from (i) imply that the data need not be inconsis-
tent with the conventional view of club objectives. The second explanation does
not seem all that plausible, given the fact these clubs had lower proﬁtability
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than their peers prior to ﬂotation. Moreover, this does not explain why they
would have improved their league performance by spending more on players
while presiding over declining proﬁts. The third explanation appears weak since
whatever problems there may be in inferring the level of economic proﬁts from
accounting proﬁts, it is reasonable to believe that changes in accounting proﬁts
are a good indicator in changes in economic proﬁts over a reasonable period of
time for a large enough sample of businesses, absent signiﬁcant changes in the
accounting rules. One problem with this argument relates to the fourth expla-
nation – if the group business has more opportunities to shelter proﬁts earned
elsewhere after ﬂotation then it may well be the case that listed companies have
an incentive to report larger losses. However, in most cases football was the pri-
mary business activity of the listed entity, and there are no cases of clubs
becoming part of much larger commercial empires as in the US.20
The ﬁfth explanation has some merits. As Table 1 shows, several clubs
ﬂoated a relatively small percentage of the stock, limiting the scope for the
market in general to put pressure on the performance of the directors
(although this story carries with it the implication that the directors were fail-
ing in their ﬁduciary duties, a serious allegation). Where small amounts of
stock were on oﬀer, it may well have been the fans who were most likely to
buy. However, there is plenty of evidence that institutional shareholders were
signiﬁcant buyers at ﬂotation of many of these clubs, and indeed it was the
perception that this was the case that gave rise to many complaints from fans
about the commercialisation of football (see e.g. Conn (1997)). Morrow
(1999) reports that ‘at its 1997 accounting year end 124 institutional share-
holders owned almost 60% of the ordinary shares in Manchester United’.
However, it may be that the institutions quickly deserted the newly ﬂoated
clubs once they realised that they were unlikely to see a reasonable return on
their investment. Few clubs ever saw their market value rise above the level
posted in the ﬁrst month of trading and most saw quite rapid declines in value
in the early months after ﬂotation. If this reﬂects institutions selling oﬀ their
shareholdings, it is unclear why they should have given up on the idea quite
so quickly. A better picture of what happened could be constructed from an
analysis of shareholder lists.
The sixth explanation is one that also might be consistent with the market
valuation data. Directors may have gambled on improving performance with
a view to exploiting the very rapid growth in media income during the period.
The escalation of player salaries in general during this period was a reﬂection
of this growth, and it may have appeared to be an individually rational strat-
egy to invest relatively heavily in the late 90s with a view to obtaining a larger
share of a larger pot in the new millennium. An example of this approach
appears to be the performance of Leeds United, which invested heavily and
gambled on achieving success not only in the Premier League but also in the
UEFA Champions League. They did in fact succeed in reaching the semi-ﬁnal
20 In 1999, the UK competition authority blocked the takeover of Manchester United by
the Sky broadcasting organisation, eﬀectively prohibiting media ownership.
48 STEPHANIE LEACH AND STEFAN SZYMANSKI
Scottish Journal of Political Economy
© 2015 Scottish Economic Society
of the latter competition in 2001, only to fail to qualify for the following
season and found themselves unable to fund their collection of star players.
They then became forced sellers of large amounts of player talent.
It seems unlikely that any one explanation will furnish a conclusive expla-
nation of the relative performance of the football clubs that ﬂoated in the
mid-1990s. However, the data does at least provide a serious challenge to the
received view that football clubs in England were utility maximisers rather
than proﬁt maximisers. If a utility-maximising club ﬂoats stock on the market
the most natural implication is a shift upward in proﬁt and downward in on
the pitch performance, almost exactly the opposite of what seems to have
occurred. Not only did proﬁts fall and performance improve on the pitch, but
the econometric evidence suggests that the reason for this change was that the
ﬂoating clubs simply spent the ﬂotation proceeds on players. While it is not
impossible to construct alternative stories to explain the data while maintain-
ing the conventional view that football clubs are utility maximiser, at the very
least the explanations seem somewhat strained. The alternative view – that
football clubs have always been proﬁt maximisers, in England at least,
deserves some consideration.
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